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Abstract 
 Predictability may be an important component of cooperative action, or it may arise 
as a by-product of involuntary entrainment with another’s behavior. Further, differences 
previously observed in cooperative versus competitive actions may represent a fundamental 
distinction between behaviors with opposite goals, or they may simply reflect the output of 
different physical actions. The role of predictability in cooperative versus competitive 
behavior was directly tested using a joint sequential button-pressing task in which P1 pressed 
their key followed by P2 pressing their own key. In the cooperative condition, both actors 
shared the goal of minimizing P2’s reaction times. In the competitive condition, P1 tried to 
maximize P2’s reaction times, whereas P2 continued to try to minimize them. It was found 
that P1 was much more predictable in the timing of their presses in the cooperative condition 
than in the competitive condition, and this coincided with faster P2 responses when 
cooperating than when competing. A second experiment showed the effects of the 
predictability of P1’s responses on the speed of P2 responses were similar when P1 was 
replaced by a schematic hand, showing they could not have been due to the transmission of 
subtle nonverbal cues by P1. These results demonstrate that being predictable is an important 
strategy in the timing of cooperative joint action whereas being unpredictable is an important 
strategy in competition, and that they have opposite effects on a co-actor’s ability to respond 
quickly. 
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The Role of Predictability in Cooperative and Competitive Joint Action 
 Much recent work on joint action has examined the motor processes underlying 
cooperative behaviour (e.g., Konvalinka, Vuust, Roepstroff, & Frith, 2010; Vesper, van der 
Well, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011, 2013; Ramenzoni, Davis, Riley, Shockely, & Baker, 2011). 
Other research has looked into the structure of competitive actions (Capozzi, Becchio, 
Garbarini, Savazzi, & Pia, 2015; Georgiou, Becchio, Glover, & Castiello, 2007; Meerhoff, & 
De Poel, 2013), and some has even compared cooperation to competition (Capozzi et al., 
2015; Georgiou et al.). Here, we show for the first time how an identical joint action game is 
approached when played in either cooperative or competitive modes. 
 One theme that has emerged in studies of cooperative joint action is predictability 
(Glowinski et al., 2013; Konvalinka et al., 2010; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009; Vesper et al., 
2011, 2013; Yin et al., 2016). Researchers have argued that when two or more actors 
cooperate towards a common aim, they adapt their behavior so as to be more predictable to a 
partner. For example, Vesper et al. (2011) examined the timing of button presses in pairs that 
were instructed to cooperate in order to achieve presses that coincided as nearly as possible. 
Vesper et al. showed not only that actors had less variable response times, i.e., became more 
predictable, when performing in a joint context relative to performing alone, but that lower 
variance correlated with improved performance when participants actively cooperated. In 
another study, Glowinski et al. (2013) examined the movements of performers in a string 
quartet, and observed that the timing of non-performance-related movements (e.g., head 
movements) became more systematic when performing as a part of a group rather than when 
performing alone. 
 Although results such as these imply that being predictable is an important, indeed 
crucial, contributor to the coordination of cooperative actions, there are alternative 
explanations for the changes in timing that have been observed. Specifically, at least some of 
the reported changes in timing may reflect an artefact of the social nature of the situation 
rather than an explicit strategy used to improve joint performance. For example, participants 
may involuntarily imitate the timing of their co-actors, a phenomenon known as entrainment 
(e.g., Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower, Goodman, & Schmidt, 2007; Romero, Kallen, Riley, & 
Richardson, 2015), or may speed up their performance and reduce its variability due to social 
facilitation (Aiello & Douthitt, 2001; Zajonc, 1965). As such, apparent increases in 
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predictability in cooperative actions may often represent nothing more than a natural 
response to performing in a social context. 
 One previous study directly compared cooperation to competition (Georgiou et al., 
2007). Here, kinematics were recorded while pairs of participants moved a block from a 
starting position near their body to a target position halfway between themselves and their 
partner. In the cooperation condition, participants tried to join their blocks together as quickly 
as possible. In the competition condition, participants competed in order to place their block 
in a target area first. Results showed that the timing of kinematic markers such as peak 
acceleration and peak velocity was much more coordinated when pairs were cooperating than 
when they were competing. However, although this study avoided a potential confound with 
the numbers of actors, it did require distinct behaviors in the cooperation and the competition 
conditions. Thus, one cannot exclude the possibility that the differing tasks themselves may 
have contributed to the kinematic changes observed in the opposing conditions. 
 Here, we sought to address some of the shortcomings noted above by constructing a 
game which, rather than varying whether or not a single or multiple actors took part (e.g., 
Glowinski et al., 2013) or varying the behavior under cooperative vs. competitive conditions 
(Georgiou et al., 2007), used a single task with two actors that differed only in terms of the 
goals of each participant in the cooperative and competitive variants. Pairs of actors sat 
across from each other at a table on which was set a computer keyboard. At the sounding of a 
tone, P1 pressed a key, followed by P2. In the cooperative condition, both P1 and P2 had the 
same goal of minimizing P2’s reaction times. In the competitive condition, the actors were 
given opposing goals: Here P1 was instructed to try to maximize P2’s reaction times, whereas 
P2 continued to try to minimize them.  
 By this method, we hoped to provide a clear demonstration of the role of 
predictability (and its opposite, unpredictability) in cooperative and competitive joint actions. 
Based on previous research, we expected predictability to be used as a tactic by P1 in the 
cooperative version of the game. In the competitive version, Game Theory holds that a 
strategy of being unpredictable would have the best outcome for P1 (Fundenberg & Tirole, 
1991). Thus, we expected P1 to use qualitatively opposite strategies in the two versions of the 
game, and for these strategies to significantly affect the performance of P2. 
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Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants. Sixty-eight participants were recruited from the campus of Royal 
Holloway University of London and took part in exchange for a small chocolate reward. All 
participants were right-handed by self-report, and all had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and no motor or neurological impairments. Participants were assigned to 34 pairs at 
random. The study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at 
Royal Holloway.  
Apparatus. The study took place in a quiet room, at a 120 cm by 80 cm table at which 
the participants were seated facing one another. On the table, halfway between the 
participants, sat a computer keyboard onto which the numbers ‘1’ and ‘2’ had been written on 
paper and taped over the ‘l’ and ‘d’ keys, respectively. The keys to be pressed by each 
participant (‘l’ for P1 and ‘d’ for P2) were each 40 cm in front of and 7 cm to the right of the 
respective participant’s midline. A computer program produced a tone to signal the onset of 
each trial, and also recorded the timing of button presses for analysis offline.  
Procedure. Participants began each trial with their right index finger resting gently on 
their respective keys. Participants were instructed to neither speak nor move any part of their 
body other than this finger on each trial. At the sounding of the tone, participants were 
required to press their keys in sequence, P1 first followed by P2. In the cooperation 
condition, participants were instructed that the aim of both was that P2’s presses occurred as 
soon after P1’s as possible, and that P1 should try to facilitate P2’s task. In the competition 
condition, participants were informed that P2 had to press their button as soon after P1 as 
possible, but that P1 was to do their best to hinder P2’s performance, within the bounds of the 
rules (i.e., no verbalizations or movements other than pressing the key). No hints or 
instructions were given as to how each actor might best accomplish their respective goals in 
either condition. There was no explicit limit on the latency of P1’s responses; they could take 
as little or as much time as they wanted to press their button on any given trial. The 
experimenter monitored each participant to ensure they followed instructions. On a given 
trial, an error was score if either participant pressed their button out of turn or moved part of 
the body apart from the responding finger. Prior to their first block in the role of P1 or P2 (the 
first and third blocks), participants were given a few practice trials to ensure they understood 
the task and what was required. 
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Design and Analysis. Each participant played each role (P1 and P2) in both a 
cooperative and competitive condition, for a total of four blocks of trials. The order of blocks 
was counterbalanced across pairs. There were 15 trials in each of the four blocks for a total of 
60 trials per pair. Response time was recorded for each press of both participants. For P1, the 
response time was recorded as the time elapsed between the onset of the tone and P1’s press. 
For P2, the response time was recorded as the time elapsed between P1’s press and P2’s 
press.  
To construct an index of the predictability of P1 responses, we generated an empirical 
approximation of the hazard function, that is, the likelihood of a response at each millisecond 
given that a response had not yet occurred. The hazard function represents the predictability 
of P1’s responses from P2’s point of view at any given instance. That is, at any point in time 
(until P1 responds), P2 knows that the P1 response has not yet occurred and would be 
interested in how likely it would be to occur imminently. Presumably, if he or she knows it 
were imminent (i.e., a high hazard rate) they would be better able to prepare a rapid response.  
This measure has been termed conditional probability by Niemi and Näätänen (1981) who 
note that it is a powerful predictor of response time in studies of the effects of foreperiod on 
simple reaction time. 
Quartiles were calculated for each participant’s responses in each condition, dividing 
the distribution of responses into four bins. The probability of a response within each 
millisecond within a bin was then estimated as the probability of a response in the bin (.25) 
divided by the millisecond bin width. These probabilities were converted to (conditional) 
hazard rates by dividing by the probability that a response had not occurred in a lower bin. 
The conditional probabilities of a response at each millisecond were changed into an 
information-theoretic index of predictability by taking the log (to the base 2) and changing 
the sign (i.e., h = -log2p where h is information and p probability; e.g., Shannon & Weaver, 
1949). A related analysis of foreperiod was used by Klemmer (1957) and Nickerson and 
Burnham (1969), but applied on a block-by-block basis. The probability index can be 
understood as the reduction in uncertainty of a response at any given millisecond in each 
participant’s distribution of responses. Less predictable responses will convey higher 
information because greater uncertainty about P1’s response has been reduced. For each bin 
in P1’s response distribution, we calculated the median P2 response time. 
We eschewed the use of null hypothesis significance testing because of the many well-known 
problems with this technique (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Dixon & O’Reilly, 1999; Wagenmakers, 
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2007). Instead, in order to quantify the evidence for different possible interpretations of the 
results, we compared the suitability of different models using likelihood ratios. This ratio 
indicates how likely the data are given one model (and its best parameter estimates) relative 
to how likely the data are given a second model (and its best parameter estimates). As 
described by Glover and Dixon (2004) and others, if the data from an independent groups 
design are normally distributed, the likelihood ratio can be written as λ = (SSE1 / SSE2)
n/2
, 
where SSE1 and SSE2 are the residual sum of squares in the two models (see also Masson, 
2011). Such likelihood ratios will always favor models with more parameters. Consequently, 
according to the suggestion of Glover and Dixon, we adjusted for the varying number of 
parameters based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973). The adjusted 
likelihood ratio can then be written as λadj = exp((AIC1 − AIC2)/2), where AIC1 and AIC2 are 
the AIC values of the two models. Such likelihood ratios have been termed evidence ratios by 
Burnham and Anderson (2002). Thus, assessing evidence based on adjusted likelihood ratios 
is tantamount to model selection based on AIC values, a common model selection criterion. 
By way of comparison, an attained significance level of .05 in some prototypical hypothesis 
testing situations corresponds to an adjusted likelihood ratio of approximately 3. The models 
were fit with the program lmer (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) running in the R 
statistical environment (R Core Team, 2016). For each model, we also report a marginal R
2 
value (that treats random effects as error), calculated using the methods of Johnson (2014) 
and Nakagawa and Schielzeth (2013) using the program r.squaredGLMM from the MuMIn 
package (Bartoń, 2016).  
 
Results 
Two pairs of participants were excluded for failure to follow the instructions. Of the 
remaining 32 pairs, 5.1% of trials in the cooperative condition and 3.9% of the trials in the 
competitive condition were scored as errors and removed from subsequent analysis. Means, 
standard deviations, and coefficient of variation for P1 and P2 in the cooperation and 
competition conditions are reported in Table 1. In order to provide evidence for overall 
differences in P1 reaction time, we compared two linear mixed-effects models, one with an 
effect of condition (R
2
 = .094) and a null model. The former was substantially better, λadj > 
1000. We also performed the same comparison for P2 reaction times. In this case, the model 
with an effect of condition (R
2
 = .022) was substantially better than the null model, λadj > 
93.96. In these models, the effect of condition was assumed to vary across participants.  
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The distribution of P1 responses in the cooperative and competitive conditions is shown in 
Figure 1. These histogram were constructed by averaging the quartiles across subjects and 
then calculating the frequency from the fact that 25% of the responses fall between each 
quartile. As can be seen, P1 responses in the cooperative condition are relatively short, with a 
narrow, fairly symmetric distribution. In contrast, responses in the competition condition are 
much more spread out with a pronounced skew.  
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Table 1 
Mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation of reaction times for P1 and P2 in 
the cooperation and competition conditions in Experiment 1. 
 
Mean (ms) 
Standard 
Deviation (ms) 
Coefficient of     
Variation 
P1    
Cooperation 1134 312 0.273 
Competition 2968 2575 0.836 
P2    
Cooperation 199 64 0.327 
Competition 232 69 0.272 
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Figure 1. Distribution of P1 response times in the cooperative and competitive conditions, 
estimated by averaging the quartiles over subjects. 
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 Figure 2 shows the median P2 responses as a function of predictability (i.e., 
information) for each P1 response bin. Two features of the data are evident. First, P1 
generated more predictable responses in the cooperation condition than in the competition 
condition: The mean information was 7.92 bits (se = 0.06) in the cooperative condition and 
10.72 bits (se = 0.06) in the competitive condition. Indeed, there was relatively little overlap 
in the two distributions. In order to quantify the evidence for this difference, we fit two linear 
mixed-effects models, one that included an effect of condition (R
2
 = .455) and a null model 
without the effect of condition. In this instance, the comparison indicated overwhelming 
evidence in favor of the model that included the effect of condition, λadj > 1000. As before, 
the effect of condition was assumed to vary across participants. 
The second result apparent in Figure 2 is that P2 response time increased with 
information; that is, P2 was slower the less predictable the P1 response was. Although 
response times were slower in the competitive condition, the effect appeared to be due simply 
to the concomitant change in information. As before, we assessed the evidence for this effect 
by fitting linear mixed-effects models. The effect of information was assumed to vary across 
participants. A model that included the effect of information (R
2
 = .071) was substantially 
better than a null model, λadj > 1000. There was no evidence that also including the effect of 
condition (R
2
 = .070) was any better, λadj = 0.38. Further, although a model with just an effect 
of condition (R
2
 = .005) was better than the null model, λadj > 1000, there was substantial 
evidence that the model that included both the effect of condition and information was better 
still, λadj > 1000. This pattern of results implies that the effect of condition was mediated 
entirely by information.  
As a further assessment of the effect of informativeness of individual P1 responses, 
we decomposed the effect of information into two components: the average information for 
each participant and the deviation from each participant’s mean. A model that included both 
components (R
2
 = .064) was substantially better than a model with only the subject averages 
(R
2
 = .006),  λadj > 1000. This result implies that the effect of informativeness on P2 reaction 
time operated at the level of individual responses, not merely the overall distribution of P1 
reaction times.  
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Figure 2. Median P2 response time (after removing the random effects of subject) as a 
function of the information in P1 responses, calculated from an empirical estimate of the P1 
hazard function. The linear function represents the parameter estimates (i.e., the intercept and 
slope of the information effect) from the model fit. 
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The hazard rate is related to the mean and standard deviation of the response time 
distributions. In particular, if the distribution is generally more spread out and skewed (as in 
the competitive condition as depicted in Figure 1), the hazard rate is lower and the 
transmitted information will be higher. However, statistics such as the mean and standard 
deviation are properties of the entire distribution rather than individual (albeit in our case, 
binned) responses. In order to assess whether the mean and the standard deviation contributed 
any further variance over and above information, we averaged the information and the P2 
responses within each condition and subject. The effects of information on P2 responses were 
much as before: A model with simply the effect of information (R
2
 = .109) was substantially 
better than the null model, λadj > 1000, and a model that added the effect of condition (R
2
 = 
.122) was no better, λadj = 0.62. Critically, the model with the effect of information was not 
improved by adding the effect of mean P1 response time (R
2
 = .112), λadj = 0.57, the effect of 
P1 standard deviation (R
2
 = .109), λadj = 0.37, or both (R
2
 = .122), λadj = 0.26. In contrast, 
models that also included the effect of information were better than those included only the 
mean response time (R
2
 = .056),  λadj = 572.76, just the effect of standard deviation, (R
2
 = 
.048), λadj = 602.33, or both (R
2
 = .055), λadj = 648.86. From these analyses, we conclude that 
informativeness of each individual subject’s distribution was a better predictor of P2 reaction 
time than other aggregate statistics. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 1 provided clear evidence that participants altered their 
behavior depending on the social context in which the task was performed, and in spite of the 
task being otherwise identical. Moreover, the results show the predicted qualitative difference 
in behavior of P1 inasmuch as the predictability of their action as modeled by the information 
provided to P2 differed strikingly depending on whether they were cooperating or competing. 
In the cooperation condition, P1 tended towards more predictable responses, whereas in the 
competition condition, P1 became much more unpredictable. This is clear evidence that 
cooperative and competitive behaviors employ opposing strategies. 
 These opposing strategies had obvious effects on the performance of P2. In the 
cooperation condition, when P1 was being more predictable, P2’s reaction times were 
shorter, and in the competition condition, P1’s unpredictability led to longer reaction times in 
P2. Both of these results were best explained as a function of the information inherent in P1’s 
responses.  
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 One interesting aspect of the results was the length of the mean reaction times of P1 
in the cooperation condition (1134 msec). It might be argued that having shorter reaction 
times by consistently pressing the button as quickly as possible would make it easier for P1 to 
maintain a more predictable response. One possibility is the observed reaction times reflected 
a desire by P1 to ensure that P2 was set and prepared to respond. Another is that P1 preferred 
to use a timing strategy that required less vigilance than responding as quickly as possible 
would have. Regardless of the reason for these seemingly large response times on the part of 
P1 in the cooperation condition, they were still notably faster than the response times in the 
competition condition. 
 
Experiment 2 
Although our instructions to both participants required that they only move their finger and 
not provide any other cues to their partner, it is possible that some other, subtle nonverbal 
cues were used by P1 to either assist or deceive P2 in either the cooperation or competition 
condition, respectively. If this were the case, it would not necessarily discount our 
explanation that P1 used predictability when being cooperative and unpredictability when 
being competitive. However, it could complicate our interpretation that the differences in the 
timing of P1’s responses in the two conditions were the paramount means by which these 
strategies were enacted. Another question is to what extent the social context of the task 
might have affected P2’s responses. In past studies, the presence of another has been shown 
to reduce response timing and variability (Aiello & Bouthitt, 2001; Vesper et al., 2011; 
Zajonc, 1965). In order to control for these factors, we conducted a second experiment in 
which the timing of P1’s responses was yoked to those in Experiment 1. Here, P1 was 
replaced by a schematic finger, and P2 performed the task in isolation. 
 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-four University of Alberta undergraduates performed a simple 
response-time task similar to the P2 task in Experiment 1. Some of these participants received 
a small monetary compensation while the balance received course credit. All participants had 
normal or corrected vision, and all were naive as to the exact purpose of the experiment. The 
study was approved by the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board. 
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Apparatus. The study took place in a quiet room. Participants sat alone approximately 
50 cm from computer screen with a keyboard placed at a comfortable distance. On the screen 
appeared a schematic depiction of an index finger near a button. In terms of visual angle, the 
depiction was approximately 5˚ vertically by 2˚ horizontally. 
 
Procedure. Participants began each trial with their right hand resting comfortably on 
the space bar. At the beginning of each trial, a brief tone was presented over headphones. 
After a variable foreperiod, the “go” signal was presented in which the schematic finger 
pressed the button (which turned blue). Participants responded as quickly as they could after 
the “go” signal by pressing the spacebar. An error message was presented if they pressed 
prior to the “go” signal.  
Participants began with a block of five practice trials with a constant foreperiod of 
750 ms. This was followed by two blocks of trials, with the duration of the foreperiod yoked 
to the sequence of P1 response times from Experiment 1. (Only trials with correct responses 
were included.) A block of trials was introduced with the message, “In this block, the 
computer will try to make it easy/hard to respond quickly” depending on whether the 
foreperiods corresponded to the cooperative or competitive task, respectively. The order of 
the two tasks matched that used in Experiment 1. 
 
Data Analysis. Data were analyzed as in Experiment 1, with the obvious exception 
that only one participant took part in each trial. As before, the effect of information was 
assumed to vary across participants. 
 
Results 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 2. The overall error rate was 3.3% in the 
cooperative condition and 2.7% in the competitive condition; these trials were excluded. As 
in Experiment 1, response time in the cooperative condition was faster than that in the 
competitive condition. In particular, a model that included an effect of condition (R
2
 = .048) 
was better than the null model, λadj > 1000.  
As shown in Figure 3, the effect of the informativeness of the (yoked) P1 responses 
on P2 response times was very similar to that obtained in Experiment 1. Similar to 
Experiment 1, a model with informativeness (R
2
 = .104) was substantially better than the 
null model, λadj > 1000, and better than a model that included the effect of condition (R
2
 = 
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.047), λadj = 380.1. However, a model that included both information and condition (R
2
 = 
.103) was better than the model with just the effect of information, λadj = 6.80, suggesting 
that in this experiment, our measure of informativeness did not predict all of the systematic 
variation in response times.  
 
 
Table 2. 
Mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation of reaction times in the 
cooperation and competition conditions in Experiment 2. 
 
 
Mean (ms) 
Standard 
Deviation (ms) 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
P2    
Cooperation 310 48 0.153 
Competition 346 64 0.185 
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Figure 3. Median response time (after removing the random effects of subject) as a function 
of the information in response signal foreperiod, calculated from an empirical estimate of the 
foreperiod hazard function. The linear function represents the parameter estimates (i.e., the 
intercept and slope of the information effect) from the model fit. 
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In order to compare the results of Experiment 2 to those of Experiment 1, we also 
performed model fits on the combined data set. A model that included the effect of 
experiment (R
2
 = .453) was substantially better than the null model, λadj > 1000, providing 
evidence that the responses in Experiment 2 were slower. As expected, a model that also 
included the effect of informativeness (R
2
 = .495) was substantially better still, λadj > 1000. 
There was no evidence that a model in which the effect of informativeness varied across 
experiment (R
2
 = .496) was any better, λadj = 0.49. In this aggregate analysis, there was only 
weak overall evidence for an effect of condition: A model with this additional effect (R
2
 = 
.496) was only slightly better, λadj = 2.70. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 clearly show that the effect of information cannot be 
attributed to the use of nonverbal cues by P1 (as P1 had been replaced by a schematic finger), 
or to the mere presence of another actor. Thus, they lend support to our argument that it is 
predictability of the first response over time that determines the speed of the second response. 
Generally, response time was slower in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. It seems likely 
that the lack of a social context in Experiment 2 may have resulted in this difference (Aiello 
& Bouthitt, 2001; Zajonc, 1965). Another contributing factor may have been the differing 
nature of the initiating stimulus: The animation of a finger pressing a button may be less 
salient than a real finger making an actual movement.  
Unlike Experiment 1, though, the information metric did not capture all of the 
variance due to condition. We suggest that this is due to differences in the expected 
distribution of responses. In the design used, there were relatively few trials in each block, so 
that participants had relatively little opportunity to familiarize themselves with the actual 
distribution of foreperiods. Instead, the uncertainty about when the response signal might 
occur is likely to have been strongly influenced by a priori expectations. Klemmer (1957) 
makes a similar argument and provides evidence regarding those a priori expectations. In 
contrast, participants in Experiment 1 were likely to have been much better able to generate 
reasonable expectancies about the distribution of responses by imagining (or remembering) 
how they might perform the P1 task. In Experiment 2, however, participants only ever 
experienced the P2 task and could not attribute the distribution of foreperiods to a peer. This 
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meant that they had less ability to generate expectancies. Again, it is also possible that the 
differences in social context may have contributed to this difference in results.  
General Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 showed clearly that opposing strategies of predictability 
and unpredictability were employed in cooperative and competitive versions, respectively, of 
an otherwise identical joint action. When the aim was to cooperate by facilitating their 
partner’s performance, P1 aimed to be as consistent in the timing of their button presses as 
possible. Conversely, when the aim was to compete, P1 was much less predictable. The 
consequence of these different approaches to cooperation and competition by P1 was that P2 
had faster response times in the cooperation version of the task than in the competition 
version, and this was true regardless of whether P1 was a person or a computer.  
This change in P1’s behavior in Experiment 1 was precisely indexed by an 
information measure derived from an empirical estimate of the hazard function. This 
information index can be described as the reduction in uncertainty of a response at any given 
point in the distribution of P1 responses. This index explained numerous effects observed in 
both experiments: 1) the differences across conditions in P1’s pattern of response times; 2) 
differences across condition in P2’s responses; 3) variations across subjects in how effective 
P1’s strategy was; and 4) variations from trial to trial in P2’s response times to particular P1 
response times. Although related to aggregate statistics such as the standard deviation and 
mean of the P1 responses, our information index subsumed these variables and explained 
additional, unique variance. This supports a simple conceptual analysis of each participant’s 
behavior: For P1, alterations in his or her pattern of response times were used to either 
minimize or maximize the information provided to P2 depending on whether the goal was 
cooperation or competition, respectively. For P2, his or her responses were rapid when the 
signal from P1 conveyed relatively little information, and slower when the signal from P1 
conveyed more information. In this sense, the results of both experiments are congruent with 
classic evidence that response time increases with information (e.g., Hick, 1952; Hyman, 
1953). 
 These results support earlier studies arguing for a role of predictability in cooperative 
joint action (Glowinski et al., 2013; Konvalinka et al., 2010; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009; 
Vesper et al., 2011, 2013; Yin et al., 2016) and extend these findings to show the distinctly 
opposite pattern of behavior, namely unpredictability, in competitive joint action. By varying 
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only the goals of the game and not the number of actors or the actions themselves in 
Experiment 1, we were able to provide strong evidence for diametrically opposing strategies 
in the very same action depending on the goals of the actors. By replacing P1 with a 
schematic finger in Experiment 2, we were able to confirm that these opposing strategies 
were effective based on their timing characteristics alone, and not as a result of subtle 
nonverbal cues or the mere presence of another actor. 
 Although Experiment 2 did show an effect of condition not evident in Experiment 1, 
it seems likely that this may have been a result of other differences between the two 
experiments, such as the lack of any experience at the P1 role for actors in Experiment 2, and 
the absence of any social context. One or both of these factors may have made it difficult 
participants in Experiment 2 to generate predictions regarding the likely distribution of 
(yoked) P1 response times. Perhaps informing participants ahead of time that the response 
times of the schematic finger in Experiment 2 were yoked to response times taken from 
actual participants performing under the same conditions might have given results more 
nearly identical to those of Experiment 1. Nevertheless, the main results as outlined above 
stand for P2’s in both Experiments 1 and 2: P2’s response times were highly dependent on 
the information provided by P1. 
 Although the present study had the strength of using a simple task that varied only in 
terms of the goals of the actors, we did not yet explore the impact of other cues on predicting 
the behavior of another actor in a joint action context. Here, actors were only able to vary the 
timing of their actions and no other kinematic features. In previous work, it has been shown 
that sensory inputs regarding a partner’s kinematics can play a key role in helping to predict 
their actions (Streuber, Knoblich, Sebanz, Bulthoff, & de la Rosa, 2011), and that the ability 
to interpret these kinematic cues can vary according to expertise (Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009). 
Future elaboration of our design might reveal more about how these other cues are used in 
cooperative versus competitive actions. 
 Whereas predictability in cooperation is clearly a beneficial strategy as it allows co-
actors to time their actions appropriately, being unpredictable during competition is equally 
important. Often, we find ourselves competing with conspecifics for resources, mates, and 
other desirables, and in these cases being predictable would make us exploitable (Fundenberg 
& Tirole, 1991) and would thus be maladaptive. As such, identifying a social situation as 
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cooperative or competitive, and then applying the appropriate strategy of being predictable or 
unpredictable, is likely a very important skill set in optimizing social behavior.   
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